Contract Modification and Self-Help Specific Performance: A Reaction to Professor Narasimhan by Hillman, Robert A.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 75
Issue 1 November 1989 Article 2
Contract Modification and Self-Help Specific
Performance: A Reaction to Professor Narasimhan
Robert A. Hillman
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Robert A. Hillman, Contract Modification and Self-Help Specific Performance: A Reaction to Professor Narasimhan , 75 Cornell L. Rev. 62
(1989)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol75/iss1/2
CONTRACT MODIFICATION AND "SELF-HELP
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE": A REACTION
TO PROFESSOR NARASIMHAN
Robert A. Hillmant
Professor Subha Narasimhan's provocative recent article points
out the similarities between a contracting party avoiding the en-
forcement of a contract modification after the other party performs
and obtaining specific performance of the original contract.' Sup-
pose, for example, that a seller of goods, without stating a reason,
insists on a price increase before performing an agreement. The
buyer, who needs the goods, agrees; the seller delivers the goods,
but the buyer then refuses to pay more than the original price. If
the seller is unable to enforce the modification, the buyer obtains
the goods and pays only the initial price. Because the buyer
achieves performance of the original agreement in this way, Profes-
sor Narasimhan calls the buyer's efforts "self-help specific
performance."'2
Professor Narasimhan sees a potential problem with this result.
She reasons that remedies for breach of contract typically do not
include specific performance and that a contract promisee therefore
does not usually pay for that potential remedy in the contract price. 3
The buyer in our example might therefore gain a windfall by agree-
ing to the modification and later successfully contesting it, instead
of seeking damages for the seller's refusal to perform the original
contract. The buyer might secure the seller's actual performance
without paying for the specific performance remedy.4
Professor Narasimhan worries that current law restricts specific
performance and liberally overturns contract modifications and
thereby encourages buyer "opportunism" via self-help specific per-
t Professor of Law, Cornell University. I thank Ted Eisenberg, Jon Macey, Dale
Oesterle, Stewart Schwab, and Robert Summers for their helpful suggestions. Sarah
Gelb provided excellent research assistance.
I Subha Narasimhan, Modification: The Self-Help Specific Performance Remedy, 97 YALE
L.J. 61 (1987).
2 Id. at 62.
3 Id. at 83 n. 11l and accompanying text. But see infra notes 73-82 and accompany-
ing text.
4 Id. at 63. Professor Narasimhan would permit buyer self-help specific perform-
ance, however, when the buyer is entitled to specific performance but the remedy is not
"practical" to the buyer, for example, because of the delay in obtaining it. Id. at 82, 84-
86. Such a buyer cannot improve its position via self-help specific performance.
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formance in our example.5 She therefore bemoans theorists' and
courts' one-sided focus on potential misconduct by the seller. In
fact, she seeks to discount the problem of the seller's refusal to per-
form without a modification by characterizing the seller's duty
under the contract as nothing more than a choice to perform or to
breach and pay damages.6 She also insists that current modification
law cannot combat seller bad faith in any event, and may actually
deter sellers from entering beneficial modifications. 7 For these rea-
sons, Professor Narasimhan proposes a "bright-line" rule that
would preclude a buyer from contesting a modification except when
the buyer could have obtained specific performance of the original
contract or when specific performance was the "theoretically supe-
rior" remedy but was unavailable for discretionary reasons.8 Under
her approach, then, a modification might be enforceable even when
current law would hold that a seller wrongfully extorted it.
My views differ significantly on many of the issues raised by Pro-
fessor Narasimhan's interesting article. In Part I, I argue that a
buyer, confronted by a seller's demand for a modification, will en-
counter significant difficulties attempting to predict whether the law
would grant specific performance, to evaluate the likelihood of de-
feating a contract modification, and to measure the other costs and
benefits of the self-help strategy. In addition, if the buyer were able
to penetrate the doctrine, the buyer would learn that courts increas-
ingly grant specific performance and enforce most contract modifi-
cations. Contract law therefore actually disfavors buyer
opportunism through self-help specific performance. I also assert in
Part I that current law adequately polices buyer opportunism in the
unlikely event that it should come to pass.
In Part II, I assert that we should not be concerned even if cur-
rent law permitted buyers to achieve self-help specific performance
when that law would deny court-ordered specific performance. In
developing Part II's argument, I dispute Professor Narasimhan's
view that a seller has a "right" to breach and pay damages and that a
5 Professor Narasimhan does not confine her analysis to buyers, nor, for that mat-
ter, to the sales context. For purposes of simplicity and clarity, I will pursue the analysis
within these contexts, but I believe my concerns apply generally. For my reaction to her
thesis in other contexts, see infra notes 49 and 116.
6 Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 65, 79, 81-82 n.105. In certain contexts, however,
she does view the potential bad faith of the party seeking a modification as greater than
that of the other party. See, e.g., id at 93 (potential exploitation by an employee's threat
to breach is "usually much greater" than that provided by the employer's self-help
remedy).
7 Id at 80-81.
8 Id. at 84, 95. An example of the latter case for self-help specific performance is
when goods are unique but the contract is long-term, so that a court would have diffi-
culty monitoring and policing performance. Id. at 88. See infra note 49.
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buyer can gain a windfall via self-help specific performance. Profes-
sor Narasimhan's approach, I contend, deflects the analysis from far
more important issues involving misconduct by the seller.
In Part III, I rebut Professor Narasimhan's claim that today's
modification law cannot help deter misconduct by a seller and will
only dissuade sellers from agreeing to a modification. I also contest
her assertion that when confronted with seller bad faith,9 a buyer's
options should be tied to contract law's current approach to con-
tract remedies even if those remedies are found wanting.10
I
THE POTENTIAL FOR BUYER OPPORTUNISM THROUGH
SELF-HELP SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
Professor Narasimhan apparently would not require a finding of
buyer bad faith in order to preclude self-help specific performance.
Instead, she seeks an "easily applied, bright-line rule"'I I diminishing
the possibility that a buyer could improve its position by contesting a
modification and thereby curtailing the buyer's potential for oppor-
tunistic behavior.' 2 If it is unlikely that a buyer would attempt to
engage in strategic behavior through self-help specific performance
under current law, however, there is little need for her rule.' 3 In
this part I seek to show that a buyer would rarely adopt a strategy of
self-help specific performance because of the uncertainty and, ulti-
mately, likely failure of the ploy.
Let us analyze Professor Narasimhan's own example:
Buyer-promisee (B) has a contract for the supply of electrical
parts with Seller-promisor (S). B intends to use the parts to as-
semble a system that she is under contract to supply to her own
customer (C). The contract between B and C provides for fines if
B does not meet the delivery date. Moreover, C is B's major cus-
tomer and will continue his relationship with B only as long as B
continues to be reliable. Before the delivery date set in B's con-
tract with S, S informs B that he will be unable to fulfill his con-
tract unless B agrees to an increase in price. B checks other
suppliers: They are committed to contracts of their own, but will
9 The problem of self-help specific performance arises only when a seller acts in
bad faith. Otherwise the modification would be enforceable and the buyer would be
precluded from self-help. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
10 Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 63, 80-8 1. See infra notes 104-12 and accompanying
text.
I Id. at 95.
12 For example, Professor Narasimhan worries about a buyer's "potential for ex-
ploitation" through self-help specific performance, id. at 61-62, about a buyer's "incen-
tives" to modify and later contest because the buyer may be better off by doing so, id. at
63, and about a buyer's potential for circumventing remedial limits. Id. at 64.
13 See infra notes 14-47 and accompanying text.
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be able to supply B at a price between the contract price and the
suggested modified price, but at a later date than that set in B's
contract with S. The delay will cause B to miss her delivery date
with C, but B can eventually deliver the system. In addition, S is
B's usual supplier of electrical parts. B has not dealt with any of
the other suppliers before; while their reputations are good, B has
no firsthand knowledge about the reliability of their parts and
their compatibility with B's own product.' 4
Professor Narasimhan asserts that B could not obtain specific per-
formance under current law but could overturn a price modification
after S delivers,' 5 thereby creating the conditions for buyer oppor-
tunism. However, contract law actually disfavors B's opportunism
through self-help specific performance even on these carefully
crafted facts.
Despite Professor Narasimhan's conclusion that B "almost cer-
tainly" would not receive the remedy, B enjoys a significant poten-
tial for court-ordered specific performance.' 6 Uniform Commercial
Code section 2-716 provides for specific performance "where the
goods are unique or in other proper circumstances." 1 7 B cannot
obtain the goods when it needs them for assembling a system for its
own "major" customer. As a result, B may lose that customer and
sustain liability for liquidated damages.' 8 Courts have already ap-
plied the "other proper circumstances" test of section 2-716 to
analogous circumstances, making specific performance more likely
than Professor Narasimhan admits.19
Professor Narasimhan reasons, however, that "[b]ecause substi-
tute parts were probably available on the market before the com-
pletion of litigation," B could not show that damages are
14 Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 67. The problem is loosely based on Austin Instru-
ment, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.2d 124, 272 N.E.2d 533, 324 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1971).
15 Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 76-77.
16 d at 77. If a court would grant specific performance, a buyer cannot improve its
position via self-help specific performance.
17 U.C.C. § 2-716(1) (1987) [hereinafter U.C.C. or Code].
18 "Since B will be late under her delivery contract with C, she will be liable for the
contractual fine and might also lose C's good will and chances to enter into future con-
tracts." Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 67-68.
19 See Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 522 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975); Proyectos
Electronicos, S.A. v. Alper, 37 Bankr. 931 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 429 (S.D. Fla. 1975); Kaiser Trading Co. v. Associated Metals &
Minerals Corp., 321 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Sedmak v. Charlie's Chevrolet, Inc.,
622 S.W.2d 694 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Stephan's Mach. & Tool, Inc. v. D & H Mach.
Consultants, Inc., 65 Ohio App. 2d 197, 417 N.E.2d 579 (1979); Ace Equip. Co. v. Aqua
Chem. Inc., 73 Pa. D. & C.2d 300 (1975). In fact, Professor Narasimhan points out that
because B uses the parts to manufacture its own product, its "major loss" is likely to be
lost opportunities. Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 77 n.84. Specific performance may
therefore be necessary because damages are too uncertain.
19891
CORNELL LI W REVIEW
"inadequate. '" 20 But Professor Narasimhan ignores B's prospect of
obtaining a preliminary mandatory injunction to compel S's per-
formance before the goods become available on the market.2' In
addition, because of uncertainty concerning the compatibility and
reliability of replacement parts, a court may decree specific perform-
ance even if parts were available at the time of litigation. 22 At mini-
mum, the outcome of a specific performance action is uncertain
under Professor Narasimhan's facts, thereby imperiling B's self-help
specific performance strategy.
Not only will it be unclear at the time of modification whether B
can obtain specific performance, B must also predict whether she
can successfully upset a modification once made.2 3 The test of en-
forceability of a modification focuses on S's good faith. 24 Consider-
able ink has been spilled demonstrating the complexity of the good
faith test in the modification context. 25 Between merchants, good
faith requires "honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." 26 An appropri-
ate investigation of this combined subjective and objective test re-
quires B to evaluate the magnitude of the increase sought, the
reasons S desires an increase, which may depend on complex mar-
ket or other data in S's control, the flexibility of S's negotiating
stance, and the availability of market substitutes or other reasonable
alternatives. 27 Because of the complexities of the good faith test,
20 Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 69; see also id. at 77: "[T]he contention that a delay
of a few weeks is sufficient to allow a finding of market scarcity is probably implausible;
courts have been quite reluctant to broaden the ambit of specific performance to market
goods."
21 See, e.g., Eastern Air Lines, 415 F. Supp. 429; Kaiser Trading Co., 321 F. Supp. 923;
see also Zurn Constructors, Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 685 F. Supp. 1172 (D. Kan. 1988).
In addition, if the sole reason B cannot get specific performance is the delay in the
courts, should we be upset if B achieves self-help specific performance and avoids (and
does not contribute to) court delay? See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
22 Professor Narasimhan agrees that if the parts are "highly specialized" specific
performance may be in order. Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 84; see also id. at 77. But she
fails to see that the issue of whether the parts pass this test will challenge both courts
and B. She also states without authority that B's preference to deal with S is insufficient
for specific performance "since B is relying on relational elements to argue that an
otherwise fungible product is in fact unique." Id. at 69 n.39.
23 Professor Narasimhan readily acknowledges the costs of uncertainty concerning
whether a modification is enforceable, id. at 70, but apparently concludes that the test of
enforceability is sufficiently clear so that these costs are not debilitating. Id. at 73-77.
24 See U.C.C. § 2-209 and comment 2; Robert A. Hillman, Policing Contract Modifica-
tions under the UCC: Good Faith and the Doctrine of Economic Duress, 64 IowA L. REv. 849
(1979).
25 See Hillman, supra note 24.
26 U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b).
27 Hillman, supra note 24, at 880-901. Professor Narasimhan agrees that the good
faith standard "complicate[s]" the modification inquiry, but concludes that the test facil-
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courts often ignore it or appear to employ it incorrectly.28 There is
little reason to suspect that B would do otherwise.
At any rate, to the extent that B can confidently sort out the
various elements of good faith and predict the likelihood of over-
turning a modification, B would learn, contrary to the picture
painted by Professor Narasimhan, 29 that defeating the modification
is improbable. Under the good faith test, according to Professor
Narasimhan, S must demonstrate that he had a "legitimate commer-
cial reason" for seeking a modification and that the modification's
price was fair.30 S's failure to prove either of these points defeats
the modification.3' But overturning a modification may be much
more difficult than Professor Narasimhan admits. For one thing,
courts would not necessarily assign to S the burdens of production
and persuasion on the issues of his reasons for seeking a modifica-
tion and the fairness of the modification. 32 For another, a court
itates defeating modifications. Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 73-74. But see infra notes 29-
37 and accompanying text.
28 Hillman, supra note 24, at 862-76.
29 Professor Narasimhan states that "B will often be able to contest a modification
successfully where she could not obtain specific performance." Narasimhan, supra note
1, at 70. She also insists that "the standards for challenging the enforceability of a modi-
fication ... are much easier to satisfy than ... those which govern the availability of
specific performance, both in terms of substantive criteria and burden of proof." Id. at
73. In addition, she asserts that "[i]n the typical situation, B will discover that her ability
to contest the modification is much greater than her ability to prevail in a suit for specific
performance." Id. at 76. These assertions are necessary to demonstrate that buyer self-
help specific performance is a real problem.
30 Id. at 74.
31 Id.
32 Professor Narasimhan asserts that "courts and commentators usually assume
that... the party attempting to enforce a modification... has the burden of proof as to
the contract's enforceability." Id. Even this issue is unsettled. Although Roth Steel
Prods. v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1983), appears to require the seller
to demonstrate a reasonable and honest basis for seeking a modification, the court fails
to distinguish between burdens of production and persuasion and to clarify what quan-
tum of evidence is required to satisfy the appropriate burden. See generally Ronald J.
Allen & Robert A. Hillman, Evidentiary Problems In-And Solutions For-The Uniform Corn-
mercial Code, 1984 DUKE LJ. 92. In addition, comment 2 to U.C.C. section 2-209 is a
slender reed upon which to conclude that the seller has the burdens: the test of good
faith "may in some situations require an objectively defnonstrable reason for seeking a
modification." Allen & Hillman, supra, at 113 (emphasis added).
Moreover, there is little reason to believe that good faith commands a significantly
different approach than a test based on the principle of economic duress: "It seems
likely that where contract modification is at issue, the law of 'duress' and the law of
'good faith' will tend to merge, as Courts focus on the issue of coercion as the principal
basis for resisting modification-enforcement." CHARLES A. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYS-
TAL, PROBLEMS IN CoNrrPAcT LAW 671 (2d ed. 1987). When courts focus on duress, they
often appear to place the burdens on the party seeking to overturn the modification. See,
e.g., Jamestown Farmers Elevator, Inc. v. General Mills, 552 F.2d 1285 (8th Cir. 1977)
(party claiming duress must show lack of other alternatives and wrongful coercive acts of
the other party); Oskey Gasoline & Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1281, 1286
(8th Cir. 1976) ("The assertion of duress must be proven by evidence that the duress
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would rarely defeat a modification on the basis of S's bad faith in the
absence of an additional showing that B had no reasonable alterna-
tive but to accept S's modification proposal. The implication that S's
motive was to extract additional gain at B's expense is simply not
persuasive if B had reasonable alternatives.33 As a result, any court
that would deny specific performance because substitute goods
would soon be available, would also likely enforce a price modifica-
tion on the theory that the substitute goods presented B with a rea-
sonable alternative to the modification.
Even if Professor Narasimhan were correct that S has the bur-
dens of production and persuasion on the issues of S's motives and
the fairness of the modification, and that failing to meet either of
them would be sufficient to defeat the modification, these burdens
may not be difficult for S to satisfy. Apparently comforted by gen-
eral business norms of flexibility and cooperation,3 4 and by the real-
ity that adjustment of agreements is therefore common, courts
rarely look with suspicion on the modification of a sales agree-
ment.35 Instead, courts view a party's attempt to overturn an obliga-
resulted from defendant's wrongful and oppressive conduct and not by plaintiff's neces-
sities.") (citation omitted); Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.2d 124, 272
N.E.2d 533, 324 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1971) (buyer had the burden of demonstrating that it
could not obtain specialized parts elsewhere). See also Palmer Barge Line, Inc. v. South-
ern Petroleum Trading Co., 776 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1985).
33 See United States ex rel. Crane Co. v. Progressive Enters., Inc., 418 F. Supp. 662
(E.D. Va. 1976) (buyer, alleging the seller's bad faith, argued that seller was the only
supplier of the precise machine required to fulfill a government contract); see also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNT'rrcrs § 175; Hillman, supra note 24, at 890-93. Professor
Narasimhan appears to concede the point: "A promisee must, at most, demonstrate that
she had no reasonable alternatives to self-help specific performance." Narasimhan,
supra note 1, at 81 n.104.
34 See Robert W. Gordon, Macaulay, Macneil, and the Discoveiy of Solidarity and Power in
Contract Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 565, 569 (discussing the work of Macaulay and Macneil);
see also infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text. Professor Narasimhan concedes that
most adjustments of "long-term" contracts are enforceable and therefore avoid the
"problem" of self-help specific performance. See Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 71 n.49.
But even relatively short-term agreements may reflect the attributes mentioned in the
text. See Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract. What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L.
REV. 483, 485-91.
35 See American Exploration Co. v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 40 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1647, 1657, 1659 (S.D. Ohio 1985), aff'd, 779 F.2d 310 (6th Cir.
1985) (party's right to modify "very broad"; modification upheld even though the court
found that the equities favored the party contesting the modification and found that the
other party's conduct was "heavy handed"); Oskey Gasoline & Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1281
(modification upheld where buyer had alternative source and a breach of contract
claim); Pirrone v. Monarch Wine Co. of Ga., 497 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1974) (modification
favorable to buyer upheld despite seller's financial distress and clogged facilities result-
ing from buyer's failure to order brandy pursuant to a contract); United States ex rel.
Crane Co., 418 F. Supp. 662 (increase in the cost of materials to sellerjustified its request
for a modification; buyer wrongly failed to protest the modification and never intended
to pay the higher price); Farmland Serv. Coop., Inc. v.Jack, 196 Neb. 263, 242 N.W.2d
624 (1976) (sellers refused to deliver under unfavorable conditions; modification upheld
[Vol. 75:62
SELF-HELP SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
tion already made, even an adjusted one, with distrust.3 6 Legitimate
reasons for seeking a modification and the fairness of the new price
therefore may not be difficult to prove.37 In addition, S and B's rela-
tion ("S is B's usual supplier") would tend to substantiate the con-
clusion that the parties intended to cooperate and adjust their
agreement from time to time.
In extreme cases, of course, a court will overturn a modifica-
tion. Assume a one-time deal lacking the usual supporting norms of
flexibility and cooperation. Aware of sudden and unexpected mar-
ket scarcity and the buyer's heavy investments in the contract, the
seller refuses to perform without a large increase in the price and
without the buyer's consent to other onerous contracts. An action
for damages by the buyer would entail delay, additional costs, and
potential undercompensation.38 The seller offers no commercially
reasonable explanation for declining to perform without the
modification.3 9
as settlement of a good faith dispute); Ruble Forest Prods., Inc. v. Lancer Mobile Homes
of Or., Inc., 269 Or. 315, 524 P.2d 1204 (1974) (modification upheld although the court
suggested that it might be "inclined to believe" the testimony offered by the party op-
posing the modification).
Commentators often cite Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.2d 124,
272 N.E.2d 533, 324 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1971), as the paradigm case for a finding of duress.
There, a contractor recovered payments made under duress when the subcontractor
refused to deliver specialized parts without a substantial increase in the price and with-
out the contrator's consent to a second subcontract; the contractor needed the parts to
satisfy its contract with the Navy and to avoid substantial liquidated damages liability
and to avoid losing future contracts. Even in this case, the trial court and appellate
division held that there was no duress, and only four out of seven judges on the New
York Court of Appeals voted to reverse. See also Hillman, supra note 24, at 873-75.
36 See, e.g., Pirrone, 497 F.2d at 29 (upsetting a modification because of a previous
breach of contract and because of hardship on the injured party would work havoc on
"desirable settlements of disputed claims"); United States ex rel. Crane Co., 418 F. Supp. at
664 (the buyer's "secret intention . . . never to pay the higher price ... is hardly in
keeping with the good faith requirement of the UCC of honesty in fact."). See also Oskey
Gasoline & Oil Co., 534 F.2d at 1286; infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
37 With respect to the reasons for seeking a modification, basically S must show a
change in conditions; S need not show that the contract is a losing one nor that the
circumstances present S with grounds to avoid the contract. See, e.g., Roth Steel Prods.
v. Sharon Steel Corp., 705 F.2d 134, 146 n.25 (6th Cir. 1983) (desire to avoid loss not
the only permissible reason for seeking a modification). Even diminished profits should
be sufficient grounds for seeking a modification.
Despite the law's current approach described in the text, I propose below that
courts should police modifications with renewed vigor so that B probably should be able
to overturn the modification in Professor Narasimhan's example. See infra notes 53-56,
72, 83, 109,, 112 and accompanying text.
38 Professor Narasimhan describes in great detail some of the potential non-com-
pensable losses of a buyer. For example, she posits that a buyer might have trained its
employees to use the seller's product. Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 66 n.26. She also
discusses, inter alia, the difficulties of recovering consequential damages, such as foresee-
ability and certainty. Id. at 66.
39 See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
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In precisely such situations, however-when a buyer is unable
to cover and is heavily dependent on performance-the likelihood
of obtaining court-ordered specific performance also dramatically
increases. 40 In fact, specific performance is especially likely when
the court is skeptical of the seller's conduct. Because specific per-
formance is an equitable remedy, if a court suspects that the seller
refused to perform simply to extort a higher price, the court will be
more inclined to award specific performance.4 1 Of course, if courts
generally grant specific performance in the drastic cases where a
buyer can overturn a modification, the buyer "can never receive more
than her contractual rights" and buyer opportunism is foiled.42
In addition to overall uncertainty concerning the legal tests of
specific performance and good faith modification, a buyer consider-
ing a self-help specific performance option, such as B in Professor
Narasimhan's example, must also compare the likely out-of-pocket
and other costs of seeking specific performance and attempting to
upset a modification. As Professor Narasimhan ably demonstrates,
these costs, which include the costs of litigation, delay, and loss of
goodwill are numerous, complex and contingent.43
Notwithstanding the severe limitations on a buyer's self-help
specific performance strategy, Professor Narasimhan decries the
Code's failure to "explicitly incorporate any notion of promisee [buyer] op-
portunism in its standards for the enforceability of modifications. " 44 But Pro-
fessor Narasimhan acknowledges that courts apply the Code's
general duty of good faith directly to buyers. 45 These courts have
had little difficulty focusing on whether a buyer sought to mislead
the seller and, if so, whether self-help specific performance merits
40 In fact, in general, courts may be warming to the Code's section 2-716 "other
proper circumstances" test. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 19. But see Narasimhan, supra
note 1, at 72 (few instances of specific performance, especially in commercial settings).
41 See, e.g., Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 522 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975) (specific
performance appropriate where supplier cancelled the contract after the purchaser ob-
jected to an increase in price); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp.
429 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (specific performance granted where seller demanded a price in-
crease or threatened to shut off buyer's supply ofjet fuel within 15 days).
42 Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 85.
43 See id. at 67-70. Although she considers the potential for a "sour[ed]" relation as
one cost of self-help specific performance, an additional cost is .damage to reputation.
Few may want to deal with a party who has the reputation of reneging on modifications,
especially in a typical environment of flexibility and cooperation.
44 Id. at 74-75 (emphasis added). Professor Narasimhan also asserts that
"[commentators on modification.., interpret 'duress' standards from the perspective
that only the party seeking the modification need justify her actions." Id. at 94-95. But
my own study of modification law under the U.C.C. proposed an analysis of the other
party's overall position, including whether that party tricked the party seeking the modi-
fication into performing. Hillman, supra note 24, at 898-99.
45 Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 74 n.70. See, e.g., Missouri Pub. Serv. Co. v. Peabody
Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 865 (1979).
[Vol. 75:62
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the courts' approbation.46 The Code's general good faith obliga-
tion therefore also serves to discourage buyer opportunism.
In summation, because a buyer will rarely have sufficient infor-
mation to concoct a strategy of self-help specific performance, be-
cause defeating a modification is improbable, because court-ordered
specific performance is probably obtainable when a buyer can mod-
ify and contest, and because law is in place to police buyer opportu-
nism, current law likely deters buyer opportunism, rather than
invites it. 4 7 Buyer opportunism via self-help specific performance
therefore may be so rare as to be no problem at all.
II
BUYER AND SELLER OPPoRmNISM: A COMPARISON
In Part I, I asserted that buyer opportunism is not a significant
problem. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that Professor
Narasimhan is correct-that under certain conditions current modi-
fication law enables a buyer, disentitled to specific performance, to
trick a balking seller into performing by agreeing to a modification
and later successfully contesting it. The question then becomes:
Should we be troubled by this result? Should we create new law to
change it? I believe the answer to both questions is no.48 In this
46 See, e.g., Oskey Gasoline & Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 534 F.2d 1281, 1286
(8th Cir. 1976); Pirrone v. Monarch Wine Co. of Ga., 497 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1974);
United States ex rel. Crane Co. v. Progressive Enters., Inc., 418 F. Supp. 662 (E.D. Va.
1976); Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.2d 124, 272 N.E.2d 533, 324
N.Y.S.2d 22 (1971). But Professor Narasimhan asserts that the standard of buyer good
faith should reflect available remedies. Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 74 n.70; see also id. at
63 n.10. Whether modification law should be tied to remedial law in this way is dis-
cussed infra in Parts II and III.
47 Professor Narasimhan cites three cases for the proposition that modification doc-
trine provides a self-help specific performance remedy: T & S Brass & Bronze Works v.
Pic-Air, Inc., 790 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1986); Roth Steel Prods. v. Sharon Steel Corp.,
705 F.2d 134 (6th Cir. 1983); and Pirrone, 497 F.2d 25. See Narasimhan, supra note 1, at
65 n.15. None of these cases suggests that self-help is an important problem. In Roth
Steel, the court failed to enforce the modification only because the court believed that the
seller was dishonest in not offering its theory that it had the right to raise prices until the
trial. 705 F.2d at 148. The court took great pains to show that the seller had reasonable
grounds for seeking a modification. Thus, the court's overturning the modification (re-
quired for buyer self-help) was unusual.
In Pirrone, the court upheld the modification and stated that breach by the party as-
serting a modification and hardship to the other party do not bring into play a claim of
duress, because such law would work havoc on "desirable settlement of disputed
claims." 497 F.2d at 29.
In T & S Brass, the court specifically repudiated the notion that a buyer's conduct
must be scrutinized when the seller, in bad faith, coerces the buyer. 790 F.2d at 1105.
See infra Part II.
48 But see Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 76: "Commentators ... would allow the
promisee [the buyer] to successfully contest the modification even ifshe would gain more by
modifying and contesting than from a suit to enforce the original contract." (emphasis in original).
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part, I compare seller and buyer conduct under both Professor
Narasimhan's and my characterization of today's modification law. I
conclude that seller opportunism is a much more serious problem
under either portrayal of the law.4 9 In fact, I question whether we
should label the buyer's strategy improper at all.
To achieve self-help specific performance, the buyer must be
able to overturn the modification. Under my interpretation of to-
day's modification law, this requires a showing of grievous seller
misconduct.50 But even under Professor Narasimhan's view of ex-
isting law, defeating a modification requires at least worrisome
seller behavior: A seller threatens to breach without a modification,
but cannot muster a "legitimate commercial reason" for seeking
one or cannot demonstrate that the modification reflects a fair
price. 51
Professor Narasimhan contends, however, that a buyer,
threatened by the seller's breach, has the "option" to bring an ac-
tion for the breach or to pursue self-help specific performance. 52
But the buyer's "choice" may be illusory. 53 Consider Professor
Narasimhan's own example: Confronted by the loss of its own ma-
jor customer and other unrecompensed damages if she "chooses"
to bring an action against S, does B have any option but to agree to
pay more for S's goods and hope to show later that a gun was to her
head?54 Even if one insists that B's choice is real in the sense that
49 Professor Narasimhan concedes the point, at least in some contexts. She urges
self-help specific performance when a supply contract is long-term and "the quality of
the parts is critical," despite the unavailability, for administrative reasons, of court-or-
dered specific performance. Id. at 88. She argues that the seller's ability to exploit is
extreme and the gains to the buyer through self-help likely exceed the costs to the seller.
In addition, in relation to the analogous issue of whether an employer should be able to
achieve self-help specific performance when an employee threatens breach, she states:
"[T]he potential for exploitation inherent in a threat to withdraw an irreplaceable ser-
vice in midstream is usually much greater than that reflected in the differing valuations
of the two remedies that would have affected the original contract price." Id at 93.
But I believe Professor Narasimhan's point is far more generalizable than she is
apparently willing to admit. For example, in Professor Narasimhan's sales problem, why
is S's potential for exploitation any less than the above examples when B's failure to
receive fungible parts in time to assemble C's system will cost B future contracts with B's
"major customer," C? But see id. at 88 n.130.
50 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
51 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
52 Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 65.
53 "[The buyer] actually had no choice, when the prices were raised by [the seller],
except to take the gears at the 'coerced' prices and then sue to get the excess back."
Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.2d 124, 133, 272 N.E.2d 533, 537, 324
N.Y.S.2d 22, 28 (1971).
54 See, e.g., id., 272 N.E.2d at 537, 324 N.Y.S.2d at 28 ("Considering [the seller's
wrongful] conduct in the past [the buyer's failure to contest earlier] was perfectly rea-
sonable, as the possibility of an application by [the seller] of further business compul-
sion still existed until all of the parts were delivered."). See also Pirrone v. Monarch Wine
[Vol. 75:62
SELF-HELP SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
she can modify and contest or face the unpleasant alternative, 55 S's
threat to breach and B's lack of reasonable options justify B's deci-
sion to pursue self help.5 6
Professor Narasimhan mounts various attacks against this
"traditional" modification analysis. She asserts that the self-help
specific performance remedy is an "equivalent weapon" to the
seller's use of the inadequacy of contract remedies to achieve a
modification.5 7 To convince, Professor Narasimhan must sanitize
the seller's conduct and castigate the buyer's. She observes that
contract damages are "compensatory" not punitive, and reasons
that contract remedies do not induce performance. 58 From this, she
reasons that a promissory obligation consists of a choice to perform
or to pay damages.5 9 In addition, because the parties know or
should know the nature of contract remedies at the time of con-
tracting, the seller's decision to breach and pay damages cannot be
immoral. 60 Accordingly, the buyer's self-help specific performance
remedy robs the seller of its rightful breach option and, because the
buyer has not paid for the remedy of specific performance, unjustly
enriches the buyer.61
But Professor Narasimhan's arguments do not persuade. Con-
tract law, taken as a whole, does. not authorize a breach option,
notwithstanding remedial law's preference for damages.6 2 The rea-
sons for this preference are complex. 63 For example, it may derive
from nothing more than ancient "turf" battles. In order to reassure
Co. of Ga., 497 F.2d 25 (5th Cir. 1974), discussed in Hillman, supra note 24, at 898-99; 1
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUrrY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTRATED By ENG-
LAND AND AMERICA § 469, at 449-50 (14th ed. 1918) (confirmation of agreement made
under duress does not bar relief if the victim is "still acting under the pressure of the
original transaction.").
55 SeeJohn Dalzell, Duress By Economic Pressure I, 20 N.C.L. REV. 237, 238-40 (1942).
56 See generally SISSELA BOR, LYING 114-48 (1979). See also id. at 43: "If to use force
in self-defense or in defending those at risk of murder is right, why then should a lie in
self-defense be ruled out?".
57 Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 80.
58 Id. at 82 n.105.
59 Id. at 81-82 n. 105; see also id. at 79; OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. THE COMMON
LAw 235-36 (M. Howe ed. 1963) ("IT]he scope of a promisor's obligation must be mea-
sured not only by his promise, but also by the remedies for its breach."). Professor
Narasimhan terms the argument that a promise is more than this "provocative" but
"misplaced" in a discussion of contract modification. Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 81-82
n.105. But what could be more important in an analysis of contract modification than
the nature of the promises the parties seek to adjust?
60 Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 79.
61 Professor Narasimhan even refers to self-help as an "evil." Id. at 93.
62 See, e.g., John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, I J.
LEGAL STUD. 277, 279 (1972) ("Common law courts.., are concerned that the damage
doctrines not encourage default.") (emphasis in original).
63 See, e.g., Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic
Effidency, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273 (1970); E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of
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"jealous" common law judges, chancellors in equity historically in-
tervened only in those rare cases where the common law remedy
was inadequate. 64 The preference could also follow from the need
to ensure jury trial rights, constitutionally guaranteed only in cases
"at law. ' '65 Alternatively, courts may wish to minimize the exercise
of their coercive authority, which may require drastic enforcement
procedures such as contempt, which, in turn, focuses concern on the
legitimacy of courts. 66 Or, as a matter of fairness, courts may seek
to protect inadvertent breachers from the pitfalls of specific per-
formance, and, because of the difficulties of sorting out aggravated
from innocent breach, treat both alike. Although these conjectures
about the reasons for contract law's preference for damages hardly
resolve the matter, they certainly suggest that more is at work here
than an effort to ratify purposeful contract breach.
Furthermore, even if contracting parties should know the rules
of contract damages and these rules appear to permit breach, they
should also comprehend the law of contract modification, which en-
titles a buyer to contest a bad faith modification. They therefore
should know that a seller's promise includes the obligation to re-
frain from threatening a breach simply to extract additional com-
pensation from the buyer.67 In short, the seller's good faith in
choosing not to perform is an issue even if, in the abstract, the seller
has the "right" to breach.68
Moreover, the parties should also be aware of myriad additional
rules of contract law that encourage performance and deter wrong-
ful breach. 69 These rules should surprise no one. People keep their
Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1970); Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The
Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936).
64 DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 61 (1973).
65 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. See D. DOBBS, supra note 64, at 69.
66 D. DOBBS, supra note 64, at 67.
67 In another context, Professor Narasimhan simply assumes that the parties com-
prehend remedial law but not modification law. Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 83 n. I 11.
68 See, e.g., Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251
(1977) (express power to terminate contract modified by a duty of good faith); Ross Sys.
v. Linden Dari-Delite, Inc., 35 NJ. 329, 173 A.2d 258 (1961) (threat to terminate
franchise agreement constitutes duress despite the right to terminate); Austin Instru-
ment, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.2d 124, 272 N.E.2d 533, 342 N.Y.2d 22 (1971) (threat
not to perform improper despite "right to breach"). See also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS 261 (1982) ("a threat may be improper if it amounts to a breach of [the duty
of good faith]").
69 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-203 (obligation of good faith performance); id. § 2-609 com-
ment I (purpose of contract is to secure performance); RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRACTS
§ 275(e) (willfulness a factor in determining material breach); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 241(e) (good faith and fair dealing a factor in determining material
breach); id. § 205 (general obligation of good faith); id. § 261 and comment d (fault a
factor in impracticability claim); id. § 352 and comment a (less certainty in proof of dam-
ages required when a breach is willful); id. § 374 and comment b (breaching party's
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promises and others rely on them, not only because of expectations
shaped by contract rules, but also because of social, business, and
ethical norms dictating that one should keep a promise.70 To en-
courage contracting and reliance on contracts, our law must reflect
and support these norms, not contradict them.71 The totality of cur-
rent contract doctrine reveals that a party's promise is therefore
much more than a mere obligation to perform or to breach and pay
damages. 72
The assumption that parties "know or should know" the rules
of contract remedies at the time of contracting, and the assertion
that a buyer has therefore not paid for specific performance, are also
highly suspect.73 Studies of contracting cultures reveal the limited
efficacy of contract rules in governing many business relation-
ships. 74 Business people recurrently fail to plan and draft their
agreements with precision, 75 and fail to call in lawyers. 76 "Business
cultures" rather than legal norms often govern the parties' rela-
tions.77 When a buyer and seller contract against this background,
restitution measure will not exceed the less generous measure of the other's increase in
wealth); idt § 251 and comment a ("a contract 'imposes an obligation on each party that
the other's expectation of receiving due performance will not be impaired'" (quoting
U.C.C. § 2-609(1))). See also Robert A. Hillman, Keeping The Deal Together After Material
Breach-Common Law Mitigation Rules, The UCC, and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 47
U. CoLo. L. REV. 555, 559-60 (1976) (courts "punish" contract breakers by failing to
require the injured party to deal further with them); Patricia H. Marschall, "Wilfulness":
A Crucial Factor in Choosing Remedies for Breach of Contract, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 733 (1982).
70 See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, The Continuity of Legislatures: Of Contracts and the Contracts
Clause, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 647, 652 (1988); ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN,
CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION 47-48 (1987).
71 See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 28 (rev. ed. 1969).
72 Fundamental fairness also dictates that we promote performance, not approve of
breach, because people rely on promises. In Professor Narasimhan's problem, for ex-
ample, B relied on S's performance in order to satisfy B's own major customer, and will
suffer significant but potentially uncompensable damages if S breaches.
The theory of promissory estoppel is also based on the fairness principle that peo-
ple rely on promises, not on promises qualified by the undercompensatory nature of
legal remedies. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90.
73 The argument that breaking a promise simply to improve one's position is not
immoral and the assertion that specific performance unjustly enriches the buyer are
therefore highly doubtful.
74 See IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CoNTRACT 5 (1980); Stewart Macaulay,
Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963). See
generally Robert A. Hillman, The Crisis in Modern Contract Theory, 67 TEX. L. REV. 103
(1988).
75 Stewart Macaulay, Contract Law and Contract Research (Part II), 20 J. LEGAL EDUC.
460, 461 (1968); see also Ian R. Macneil, Contracts and the Big Wide World, 2 CORNELL L.F.
12 (Spring 1975): ("[Modern contractual] relations are so complex that no one with any
sense believes that complete and binding planning at any one time is possible; everyone
of any perception realizes that the relation will grow and change with events occurring in
a largely unforeseeable future .... ).
76 Macaulay, supra note 75, at 461-62.
77 Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 465, 467.
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it is highly unlikely that the price reflects the potential for specific
performance. 78
Moreover, even when the parties' contract is more formal, they
may be unable to calculate the probability of specific performance
and account for it in the price because the remedy is too amor-
phous. As already noted, Code section 2-716 provides for specific
performance "where goods are unique or in other proper circum-
stances."' 79 The rule hardly offers a clear test of when the remedy
applies. When are goods "unique"? What are "other proper cir-
cumstances?" 80 At best, we know that when there are ready market
substitutes a court will balk at specific performance, and when the
goods are completely unavailable on the market specific perform-
ance is likely.8' But this "refinement" of the specific performance
test hardly clarifies the issue for many parties at the contract forma-
tion stage, who must predict future market activity and who must
assume that their contract will fall within the extremes of the specific
performance test.8 2 In fact, a seller's subsequent request for a price
increase, which triggers the buyer's self-help specific performance
strategy, will frequently be based on unanticipated market condi-
tions not reflected in the parties' pre-contract bargaining.
For all of these reasons, contract's remedial preference for
damages does not insulate a seller's breach decision from charges of
unlawfulness, immorality, or unfairness. Nor does self-help specific
performance unjustly enrich the buyer. In Professor Narasimhan's
problem, then, we should be content even if the law precluded spe-
cific performance and overturned the modification. After all, S,
without justification, demanded an unfair price increase.8 3 B faced
delay, the loss of its major customer, and potential undercompensa-
78 Professor Narasimhan acknowledges that to assume parties factor legal remedies
into the contract price may be counterfactual. Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 83 n. 111; see
also Subha Narasimhan, Of Expectations, Incomplete Contracting, and the Bargain Principle, 74
CALIF. L. REV. 1123, 1129 (1986) ("[I]ncomplete contracting should be the fundamental
premise about the contracting process."). Of course, a buyer may pay indirectly for the
potential specific performance remedy in some circumstances, such as when the price
reflects the goods' uniqueness.
79 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
80 But see Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 85 n. 120: "The threshold requirements for
receiving specific performance are governed by well-defined rules."
81 See, e.g., In re Tennecomp Sys., Inc. v. Public Serv. Co., 12 Bankr. 729 (E.D. Tenn.
1981); Pierce-Odom, Inc. v. Evenson, 5 Ark. App. 67, 632 S.W.2d 247 (1982); Sedmak v.
Charlie's Chevrolet, Inc., 622 S.W.2d 694 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); see also U.C.C. § 2-716
comment 2: "[I]nability to cover is strong evidence of 'other proper circumstances' ";
Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 69 n.39.
82 Because unanticipated circumstances are inevitable in our complex technological
society, even sophisticated business people cannot always predict the future with accu-
racy. See Robert A. Hillman, An Analysis of the Cessation of Contractual Relations, 68 CORNELL
L. REV. 617, 627-28 (1983).
83 Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 77.
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tion if it did not agree to the price increase. We should not con-
struct rules that encourage S's conduct.
III
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MODIFICATION LAW TO DETER
SELLER OPPORTUNISM
Let us now assume, contrary to Parts I and II, that current law
invites buyer self-help specific performance and that such a strategy
is troublesome. Even if a seller's potential for misbehavior greatly
exceeds the buyer's, if modification law is ineffective to combat
seller opportunism and fuels the buyer's, then Professor
Narasimhan's concerns still have merit. In this section, however, I
assert that, despite Professor Narasimhan's apprehensions, modifi-
cation law helps deter seller opportunism and is not deficient on
efficiency or other grounds. We therefore should preserve current
modification law-perhaps even strengthen it-even if a buyer could
improve its remedial entitlement by achieving self-help specific
performance.
In asserting her view of the inadequacy of existing modification
law to police sellers, 84 Professor Narasimhan fails to emphasize that
in reality courts underutilize the good faith policing tool.8 5 Such an
approach conflicts with her perception that the legal standard for
overturning modifications is relatively generous, 6 and simply calls
for enhanced scrutiny of a seller's conduct. Instead, she contends
that modification law is impractical to police sellers because they will
avoid modifying and will turn to other methods of achieving their
ends.8 7 She also claims that modification law is inefficient.8 8 I now
turn to these arguments.
Professor Narasimhan surmises that self-help specific perform-
ance is more costly to a seller than liability for damages.8 9 Accord-
ingly, she claims that if buyers resort increasingly to self-help
specific performance a seller might not offer a buyer the option of
modifying the price.90 Instead, a seller "might create an 'ex-
84 "Self-help specific performance cannot generally be justified as a corrective for
[seller) opportunism." Id. at 80.
85 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
86 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
87 See infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
88 See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
89 Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 80.
90 Id. at 81. Professor Narasimhan also argues that the parties will encounter diffi-
culties attempting to adjust the initial contract price to reflect the cost of self-help spe-
cific performance. The buyer will not pay for the self-help remedy because the seller will
not offer an adjustment if it knows that the buyer need not honor the modification. Id. at
80-8 1. But see supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
1989]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
change' "91 or even breach. 92 By the former Professor Narasimhan
means that a seller will offer a buyer additional consideration for the
buyer's agreement to increase the price.93 This troubles Professor
Narasimhan because she believes that such "exchanges" would be
difficult to police for seller bad faith.94 She offers little evidence,
however, that policing an "exchange" would be any more difficult
than policing a unilateral price modification. 95
I am also not convinced that sellers have formulated or will cre-
ate strategies to avoid a unilateral price modification, even if ex-
isting law relatively generously entitles a buyer to overturn one.
Despite my insistence that seller opportunism is potentially a seri-
ous problem, it is not inconsistent to reason that most sellers will
believe that they are rightfully negotiating for a fair adjustment to
reflect market or other conditions. Few sellers would admit even to
themselves the possibility that their behavior is wrongful and likely
to be overturned. Moreover, most sellers will perceive that their
buyers, concerned about potential non-compensable costs of con-
testing a modification, such as litigation expenses, a soured relation-
ship, loss of good will and damage to reputation, and even anxious
about the success of their efforts to contest, will be reluctant to chal-
lenge an adjustment. A seller consequently will be delighted with
the buyer's "willingness" to adjust.
In addition, breach may rarely be a viable choice for a seller96
because of the fear of loss of reputation, of goodwill and even of
liability for the breach. As to the latter, on the whole Professor
Narasimhan correctly paints a bleak picture of our remedies sys-
tem's potential to make an aggrieved party whole. 97 Nevertheless,
while generally under-compensatory, contract remedies may be suf-
ficiently uncertain to make a seller unwilling to risk a breach. The
91 Id. at 80 n.99 and 83 n.ll0.
92 Professor Narasimhan assumes that sellers will prefer the former. See id. at 84
n. 115. But see Thornton E. Robison, Enforcing Extorted Modifications, 68 IowA L. REV. 699
(1983).
93 Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 84 n.115.
94 Id. at 73 n.60.
95 Professor Narasimhan states that "the policing of the fairness of a new exchange
of obligations is complicated by the fact that the court has no benchmark for the value
the parties would have set upon the exchanged, modified performances absent opportu-
nism.... In theory, in the case of a unilateral modification, the court has a benchmark,
the original unmodified price." Id. But she acknowledges that the original price is no
benchmark at all when circumstances change. Id. Moreover, most indices of coercion,
such as seller threats and the buyer's absence of choice, will exist regardless of whether a
coerced modification is unilateral. In addition, she ignores the fact that courts regularly
police the fairness of an exchange under the guises of public policy, unconscionability,
and even inequality of the exchange.
96 But see id. at 81, 83-84; Robison, supra note 92.
97 Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 65-67.
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seller may be tied up in costly and time-consuming litigation about
the extent of the damages; the buyer may recover large consequent-
ial damages; the buyer may be entitled to specific performance. In
short, just as the buyer confronts significant uncertainties at the
time the seller seeks a modification, the seller cannot assume that it
will improve its position by "creating an exchange" or breaching
rather than by agreeing to a modification.98
Both Professor Narasimhan and I thus speculate about the
likely conduct of buyers and sellers under current modification law.
Nevertheless, before we diminish the potential of that law to police
sellers in order to deal with the less worrisome problem of buyer
opportunism, we should require -more concrete evidence of modifi-
cation law's current lack of utility.
Professor Narasimhan also asserts that current modification law
is undesirable because it is inefficient: A buyer, in deciding to pur-
sue self-help, can ignore the seller's costs of performing the con-
tract.99 Potentially, these costs could outweigh the buyer's gains
from self-help specific performance. But modification law does re-
quire the buyer to consider the seller's costs. The self-help strategy
can succeed only if the buyer can defeat the modification. Under
current law, the buyer's gains may well exceed the seller's costs of
performing in precisely such cases.100 The buyer faces market scar-
city and serious uncompensable reliance losses if the seller does not
perform. On the other hand, the seller's failure to muster a "legiti-
mate commercial reason" for seeking a modification suggests that
the seller's motive was not based on substantial cost increases. 1 1
Conversely, if excessive costs would excuse the seller from perform-
ance on impracticability or other grounds, a price modification
would be enforceable despite the seller's "threat" not to per-
form. 10 2 Modification law therefore thwarts the self-help strategy in
precisely those cases where the seller's costs of performing are likely
to exceed the buyer's gains.
Even if modification law is inefficient, Professor Narasimhan
admits that remedial law's preference for damages over specific per-
formance may be inefficient as well. 10 3 Efficiency reasons are there-
98 "S will only prefer breach if the cost of performance, including the opportunity
cost, exceeds the damage award he would be required to pay." Id. at 89.
99 Id. at 81.
100 Id. at 88.
101 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
102 See Hillman, supra note 24, at 887-94.
103 Professor Narasimhan sets forth the debate concerning whether specific per-
formance or damages is efficient and concludes that the debate is inconclusive.
Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 77-79; see also id. at 81, 82 n.105, 94.
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fore unhelpful in deciding whether to permit self-help specific
performance.
Despite several general statements that remedial law deserves
an exalted position over modification law, 10 4 Professor Narasimhan
offers little in the way of additional explanation for why remedial
law's preference for damages should preclude self-help specific per-
formance. 10 5 In fact, assuming consistency in approach is a virtue
here,1 6 current remedial law, and not modification law, appears to
present the anomaly. 10 7 Our choice is either to thwart the buyer's
self-help remedy by restructuring modification law to defeat a
buyer's claim of seller bad faith, or to diminish the effect of a seller's
wrongful coercion by altering remedial law so that specific perform-
ance is more readily available.108 Because the problem of seller op-
portunism dwarfs buyer opportunism, because current modification
law helps deter seller misconduct 0 9 and existing contract remedial
law fosters it,11° and because the superior remedy for contract
breach remains uncertain, 11' the appropriate course is to police
contract modifications with renewed vigor, unconcerned by whether
the buyer achieves specific performance indirectly. Moreover, we
should call for additional investigation into whether the law of rem-
edies should be reformed. 112
104 "Self-help enforcement measures must be integrated into the general fabric of
contract remedy." Id. at 63; see also id at 80 and 82 n.105.
105 Professor Narasimhan acknowledges that modification law could be utilized as a
"back door" to correct remedial deficiencies. Id at 82 n.105. But how do we know that
modification law is the back door and remedial law is the front door? If remedial law
should reflect substantive rights and modification law preserves a self-help route to spe-
cific performance, then, perhaps, remedial law should reflect modification law's position.
Professor Narasimhan also argues that private action should be consonant with the goals
of contract law. Id. at 81-82. But does current remedial law or current modification law
better reflect these goals?
106 Even this is debatable. See id. at '63 n.11 (discussing whether private action
should be independent of state control).
107 At times, Professor Narasimhan seems to concede as much. See, e.g., id. at 81
n.101 (acknowledging the possibility that "at least where contract law fails to prefer one
remedy over another, remedies should be chosen to minimize opportunism"). With this
goal in mind, specific performance might be appropriate in transactions involving reli-
ance on the relation. See also id. at 84 ("In contracts involving non-fungible goods or
services, the only way to deter promisor [seller] opportunism is to strictly enforce the
specific performance remedy.").
108 The latter may already be part of the law of remedies. See supra notes 19 and 40
and accompanying text.
109 See supra notes 38-39, 84-98 and accompanying text. Of course, as I have argued,
few courts actually overturn modifications. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
But the problem of seller extortion suggests that we should strengthen modification
law's policing function, not diminish it.
110 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
111 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
112 In fact, recall that one important reason offered by Professor Narasimhan for
why B may not receive specific performance in her sales problem is not even related to
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CONCLUSION
According to Professor Narasimhan, a court should not over-
turn a modification formed after a seller refuses to perform without
an increase in price or other consideration unless the buyer was en-
titled to specific performance of the original contract or specific per-
formance, although unavailable, was the "preferred" remedy."13
Professor Narasimhan would therefore deflect the analysis away
from seller bad faith into the murky environs of remedial law. She
would do this so that the buyer could not improve its position by
agreeing to a modification and later successfully contesting it.114
I do not believe that buyer opportunism through self-help spe-
cific performance is a significant problem. On the other hand, in-
vestments by the buyer in the contract and inadequate remedies for
the seller's breach create enticing incentives for seller coercion. I
therefore disfavor Professor Narasimhan's suggestions. Moreover,
although Professor Narasimhan believes that current modification
law fosters buyer opportunism with "no gains for the goals of con-
tract enforcement,"' " 5 I assert that existing law appropriately fo-
cuses on enforcing freely made agreements and deterring extorted
ones.16 Achieving these goals requires policing seller bad faith
some important remedial policy goal, but is based on the delay in our courts. "Because
substitute parts were probably available on the market before the completion of litiga-
tion," B cannot show that damages are inadequate. Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 69.
Professor Narasimhan, in effect, urges us to compound the problem ofjudicial delay by
tying a buyer's rights in the modification context to tardy remedial law. Instead, I would
argue that Professor Narasimhan's sales problem best fits within the second category of
cases in which she permits self-help: where specific performance is the "appropriate"
remedy but may be unavailable because of the administrative inadequacies of courts. Id.
at 82, 86-89.
113 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
114 A significant effect on current modification analysis would be that contract dam-
ages, which Professor Narasimhan concedes to be woefully inadequate to make a buyer
whole, would be considered a reasonable alternative to agreeing to the seller's modifica-
tion so that the buyer could not successfully defeat the modification on the basis of the
seller's coercion. Narasimban, supra note I, at 95.
115 Id.
116 U.C.C. § 2-209 comment 1; Ralston Purina Co. v. McNabb, 381 F. Supp. 181
(W.D. Tenn. 1974).
Although my comments are limited to buyer self-help specific performance, I be-
lieve that other types of contracts require a similar analysis. For example, I am not
concerned about self-help specific performance in either employment or construction
contracts. First, parties to these contracts will suffer from many of the same informa-
tional deficiencies and legal hurdles addressed in Part I. In addition, even Professor
Narasimhan agrees that we should not be troubled when threatened employers or land-
owners achieve self-help specific performance, even though they are disentitled to spe-
cific performance for reasons of judicial discretion. Professor Narasimhan correctly
reasons that these parties' contracting counterparts have the "greatest opportunity for
opportunistic behavior." Narasimhan, supra note 1, at 88; see also id. at 93, 94. In fact,
Professor Narasimhan also admits that modifications of long-term contracts "should be
unaffected" by her analysis because such adjustments should be enforceable under the
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
even if this creates the possibility that a buyer could receive a per-
formance that the remedial system, because of its inadequacies,
would not provide.
"unexpected circumstances" test. Id. at 71 n.49. The vast array of cases immune from
concern about self-help specific performance bears out my suspicion that it is no prob-
lem at all.
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